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AbstrACt
Objectives ‘Horizontal inequity’ in healthcare finance 
occurs when people with equal income contribute 
unequally to healthcare payments. Prior research is 
lacking on horizontal inequity in China. Accordingly, this 
study set out to examine horizontal inequity in the Chinese 
healthcare financing system in 2002 and 2007 through 
two rounds of national household health surveys.
Design Two rounds of cross-sectional study.
setting Heilongjiang Province, China.
Participants Adopting a multistage stratified random 
sampling, 3841 households with 11 572 individuals in 
2003 and 5530 households with 15 817 individuals in 
2008 were selected.
Methods The decomposition method of Aronson et al was 
used in the present study to measure the redistributive 
effects and horizontal inequity in healthcare finance.
Findings Over the period 2002–2007, the absolute 
value of horizontal inequity in total healthcare payments 
decreased from 93.85 percentage points to 35.50 
percentage points in urban areas, and from 113.19 
percentage points to 37.12 percentage points in rural 
areas. For public health insurance, it increased from 17.84 
percentage points to 28.02 percentage points in urban 
areas, and decreased from 127.93 percentage points to 
0.36 percentage points in rural areas. Horizontal inequity in 
out-of-pocket payments decreased from 79.92 percentage 
points to 24.83 percentage points in urban areas, and from 
127.71 percentage points to 53.10 percentage points in 
rural areas.
Conclusions Our results show that horizontal inequity 
in total healthcare financing decreased over the period 
2002–2007 in China. In addition, out-of-pocket payments 
contributed most to the extent of horizontal inequity, which 
were reduced both in urban and rural areas over the period 
2002–2007.
IntrODuCtIOn 
Apart from securing access to healthcare, 
contributions towards financing health-
care may redistribute the disposable 
income of households. This redistribution 
can be assessed on vertical and horizontal 
levels: ‘vertical redistribution’ occurs when 
healthcare payments are disproportionately 
related to ‘ability to pay’ (ATP); ‘horizontal 
redistribution’ occurs when people with 
equal ATP contribute unequally to healthcare 
payments. Vertical redistribution and hori-
zontal redistribution are generally defined as 
a ‘redistributive effect’ (RE). An RE can be 
quantitatively decomposed into three aspects: 
‘vertical’, ‘horizontal’ and ‘reranking’. 
The vertical effect shows how households 
with different incomes are affected by the 
financing, the horizontal effect measures the 
inequity generated among households with 
the same pre-financing income, while the 
reranking effect quantifies the change in the 
order of income distribution.
In the literature, a considerable number 
of studies have been published on vertical 
equity.1–5 Horizontal inequity and reranking, 
by contrast, were not reported in great detail 
until 1994. In that year, Aronson, Johnson 
and Lambert (hereafter, AJL) provided a 
decomposition method to measure the RE of 
income tax through pre-Gini and post-Gini 
coefficients, and revealed the separate contri-
butions to the RE of income tax of (a) the 
effective schedule (the ‘vertical effect’), (b) 
the unequal treatment of equals arising from 
departures from this effective schedule (the 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This study was the first to evaluate the horizontal 
inequity in healthcare finance in China.
 ► The study was the first to explore the relationship 
between vertical and horizontal equity in healthcare 
financing system in China.
 ► Our study demonstrates that horizontal inequity 
also contributed to the overall inequity in healthcare 
finance, and that it should be simultaneously con-
sidered with vertical inequity when renovating the 
healthcare financing system.
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‘horizontal effect’) and (c) the reranking of unequals as a 
result of such departures (the ‘reranking effect’).6 Later, 
in 1997, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer applied the AJL 
method to decompose the change in income inequality 
caused by healthcare finance into vertical, horizontal and 
reranking effects in the Netherlands, with each effect 
corresponding to a different dimension of equity: vertical 
equity, horizontal inequity and reranking.7 By simulta-
neously revealing these three different dimensions of 
equity, the AJL decomposition constitutes a useful tool 
for assessing the fairness of healthcare financing. Conse-
quently, horizontal inequity has since been measured 
and evaluated in empirical studies using the AJL decom-
position method. The findings of these studies indicated 
that factors such as social status, geographic distribution, 
employment type, insurance type, income composition, 
urban–rural classification, health condition and race 
or ethnicity may contribute to horizontal inequity and 
reranking.7–9 However, only three papers have conducted 
empirical evaluations of horizontal inequity in healthcare 
finance—for the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, 
respectively.7–9 Moreover, until now, no such empirical 
assessments have been conducted in China. Since China 
launched new and extended the established health insur-
ance schemes, a greater proportion of the population has 
been covered by health insurance. However, the impact 
on horizontal inequity in healthcare finance is uncertain. 
Little is known about the extent of horizontal inequity in 
healthcare finance during the reform of China’s health-
care insurance in the past decades.
China has established new types of health insur-
ance since 1998. Health insurance coverage has been 
expanded to include individuals with different socioeco-
nomic statuses. In each socioeconomic group, individuals 
with diverse social statuses, urban–rural classifications 
and geographic access to healthcare joined health insur-
ance schemes. Until recently, though, there has been no 
reliable evidence with which to evaluate whether China’s 
expansion of health insurance coverage has been 
successful in reducing horizontal inequity in healthcare 
finance. The present study examines the RE and hori-
zontal inequity in the Chinese healthcare financing 
system in 2002 and 2007 for four different sources of 
financing; namely, general taxes, public health insur-
ance, private health insurance and out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the 
Introdcution section provides a brief overview of Chinese 
health insurance reform. The Methods section outlines 
our data sources and describes the computational 
methods used in this study. The Resutls section presents 
the findings of the study and delineates how empirical 
results in different financing sources, areas and times 
may be compared. Finally, the Discussion section and 
the Conclusions section discuss the empirical results and 
attempt to draw some conclusions in relation to broad 
lessons from the Chinese experience.
ChInA’s heAlth InsurAnCe reFOrM
Influenced by social and economic transitions since the 
early 1980s, China’s healthcare system was reformed to 
transit from one based on a planned economic model 
to a market-based system. Government health input 
rapidly decreased with the decentralisation of healthcare 
financing.10–12 Subsequently, the share of public funding 
in the healthcare system decreased and the proportion 
of private financing increased.13 14 For instance, under 
China’s planned economy, healthcare in urban areas 
had been financed primarily through the Government 
Welfare Insurance Scheme and the Labor Insurance 
Scheme. The former covered mainly civil servants and 
government employees, college students and veterans, 
whereas the latter was for workers and their dependents 
across all formal sectors of the economy.10 15 However, 
these schemes faced challenges during the market-ori-
ented economic reforms, which resulted in huge changes 
in healthcare financing patterns. Along with the higher 
demand by employees for quality care, and corresponding 
financial pressures making these demands unafford-
able, financing from the Government Welfare Insurance 
Scheme and the Labor Insurance Scheme decreased 
markedly and citizens had to pay much higher OOP 
expenses for healthcare.16 Meanwhile, for the majority 
of the rural population, and the poor in particular, the 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) played a key role in 
guaranteeing access to basic health services.17 18 However, 
the CMS began to collapse after the initiation of China’s 
Household Contract Responsibility System in the early 
1980s, which decreed that healthcare would be funded at 
the household level. Only 9.3% of rural farmers were still 
enrolled in the CMS, and >80% had no health insurance 
coverage by 2002.19 Rural residents without health insur-
ance had to pay for their healthcare by direct payment, 
which created barriers to basic health services and made 
medical expenses unaffordable to the poor and vulner-
able groups, especially in respect of health services that 
had become more expensive.20
Such transformations greatly changed China’s health-
care financing structure. Between 1980 and 2002, the 
percentage of government spending for healthcare 
dropped from 36.24% to 15.69% and the percentage of 
citizens covered by public health insurance plummeted 
from 42.57% to 15.64%. Conversely, the share of health-
care spending as OOP payments increased from 21.19% 
to 57.72%.21 Such a heavy dependence on OOP payments 
resulted in a segmented and tiered healthcare financing 
system.22 Results from China’s third National Health 
Services Survey showed that, in 2002, 48.9% of outpa-
tients (57.0% and 45.8% in urban and rural areas, respec-
tively) did not visit any health institution. Among those 
who were admitted but did not use inpatient services, 
75.4% could not afford hospital expenses.19
In order to decrease OOP and provide basic health insur-
ance to the general population, China’s government took 
steps to establish and extend insurance coverage. In 1998, 
Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) was 
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introduced to cover urban workers in the formal sector. 
UEBMI coverage was gradually extended from covering 
employees in the larger formal sector to those working 
in all forms of organisations, such as government insti-
tutions, state-owned and collective enterprises, private 
enterprises, enterprises with foreign investment, social 
organisations and private non-profit units.23 However, 
only providing coverage to urban workers raised equity 
concern in relation to the remaining urban residents who 
were not covered by the UEBMI scheme. Thus, in 2007, 
the Urban Residents’ Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) 
scheme was launched to extend urban health insurance 
coverage to an additional 155 million uninsured citizens, 
including the unemployed, children, students and elderly 
persons without pensions.24 Meanwhile, in rural areas, 
the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) had 
been initiated in 2003 with the purpose of rebuilding rural 
health insurance coverage. Since its formation, China’s 
authorities have provided additional public spending on 
NCMS, which has achieved a high coverage level for rural 
residents, with the insured rate increasing from 9.64% in 
2002 to 94.44% in 2007.25
MethODs
Data source
The data for the analysis were drawn from two rounds 
of the National Health Services Survey conducted in 
Heilongjiang Province, China. The two rounds were 
conducted between August and October in 2003 and 2008 
in the sample regions, with the information recorded 
in 2002 and 2007, respectively. Heilongjiang Province, 
located in the northeast of China, is a middle-income 
province in terms of per capita gross domestic product 
and has a population of >20 million people.26 The per 
capita gross domestic product was US$1152.72 and 
US$2943.37 in Heilongjiang Province in 2002 and 2007, 
respectively. Adopting a multistage stratified random 
sampling method, the survey randomly selected 13 cities 
or counties. In every city or county, eight communities or 
villages were randomly selected. Then, about 30 house-
holds were randomly selected from each community or 
village. Finally, 3841 households with 11 572 individuals 
in 2003 and 5530 households with 15 817 individuals in 
2008, respectively, were selected in the survey. Tables 1 
and 2 present detailed data about the descriptive and 
socioeconomic characteristics for the urban and rural 
samples, respectively.
We adopted the same questionnaire in the two rounds of 
the survey. The national survey gathers extensive informa-
tion about households’ socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, including urban–rural classification, 
number of household members, age, gender, educational 
attainment, professions of household members and 
household expenditures. Monthly household expendi-
tures on food, housing, clothing, traffic, electricity, water, 
fuel, communication, education, exercise, entertain-
ment, medical care and other types of expenditure were 
queried through the household head or the member 
most familiar with the home’s affairs. Unexpected expen-
ditures during the previous year were also recorded. 
Regarding healthcare payments, information was 
obtained through two sources of data: one was the survey 
above, while other data were taken mainly from the local 
statistic yearbook of tariffs, taxes and contribution rates 
for public health insurance. With regard to general taxes, 
specific taxes that were considered included taxes on the 
purchase of cigarettes, alcohol, entertainment, electricity, 
gas and any excise taxes on restaurants, bars, lodging and 
other consumption taxes. Taxes were approximated by 
applying specific tax rates to the corresponding expen-
ditures. The proportion of government expenditure on 
health was 4.12% and 5.19% of government expenditure 
in 2002 and 2007, respectively.27 Since the government 
expenditure mainly came from general taxes, we assumed 
that the health financing took 4.12% and 5.19% of the 
total general taxes in 2002 and 2007, respectively. With 
regard to public health insurance, flat rate contributions 
were recorded directly in household interviews with 
respondents covered by the URBMI, CMS and NCMS. For 
respondents covered by the UEBMI, the contribution was 
estimated by applying contribution rates to the earnings 
of covered workers. Private health insurance premiums 
were obtained directly via household interviews. Informa-
tion about OOP payments included healthcare expendi-
tures on outpatient care and prescriptions that were paid 
by individuals during the two weeks prior to the house-
hold interview. Inpatient OOP expenditures during the 
preceding 12 months were also recorded.28
Data analysis
Measurement of ATP
The unit of healthcare finance was on the household level, 
based on which expenditures and healthcare payments 
were aggregated. The amount of household expendi-
ture was used as the measurement of ATP.28 Adjustment 
was made according to the size and age structure of the 
household to both ATP and each component of health-
care financing. The scale of ‘adult equivalents’ (AE) in 
the household was calculated as
  AE =
(
A + 0.5K
)0.75
  (1)
where A was the number of adults in the household and 
K the number of children (0–14 years).
AJL decomposition
An AJL decomposition that measured the RE of health-
care payments on income distribution was used to 
compare the inequality—as measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient—of pre-payment income with that in post-payment 
incomes.7 The ‘redistributive impact’ can be defined as 
the reduction in the Gini coefficient caused by the health-
care payments.6 Thus:
  RE ≡ GX − GX−P  (2)
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where GX and GX−P are the pre-payment and post-pay-
ment Gini coefficients, respectively, wherein X denotes 
pre-payment income, or, more generally, some measure 
of ATP, and P denotes healthcare payments. The AJL 
approach demonstrated that the RE can be decomposed 
as
  RE = V−H− R  (3)
The first term, which AJL refer to as V, measures the 
inequality reduction that would have been obtained 
if there had been no differential healthcare payment. 
The second term, which AJL refer to as H, measures 
the extent of classical horizontal inequity—the unequal 
treatment of equals. The third term, which AJL refer 
to as R, measures the extent of reranking in the move 
from the pre-payment income distribution to the 
post-payment income distribution.7 To distinguish and 
compute these components, groups of pre-payment 
equals are required to be artificially created. This is 
done by defining certain pre-payment income intervals, 
and then labelling all households with incomes in that 
range as equals. All households within an interval are 
attributed the mean within-interval income, xj; V itself 
can be decomposed into a ‘payment rate effect’ and a 
‘progressivity effect’,
 
 
V =
(
g
1−g
)
KE  
 (4)
with g the sample average healthcare payment rate (as 
a proportion of income) and KE being the Kakwani index 
of payments computed under the assumption of with-
in-group equality; that is, in all households in the same 
(predefined) bandwidth of (equal) pre-payment income, 
everyone pays the same amount (ie, under horizontal 
equity conditions).
Horizontal inequity H is measured by the weighted sum 
of the group (j) specific post-payment Gini coefficients, 
 G
X−P
j  , where weights are given by the product of the 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and socioeconomic characteristics for the urban sample
Variable
2002 2007
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
Gender (female) 2613 0.50 3140 0.51
Age (years) 5265 38.86 18.96 6188 43.25 19.11
  0–14 699 8.41 4.14 579 8.13 4.11
  14–59 3738 38.07 11.41 4332 40.36 11.74
  60+ 828 68.14 6.43 1277 68.99 6.65
Number of household members (average) 1923 2.74 0.91 2433 2.67 0.97
Equivalent household income 1923 806.33 1031.35 2433 1285.26 1061.11
  1st quintile 383 197.22 46.95 485 492.12 108.42
  2nd quintile 385 344.72 42.55 489 772.76 68.33
  3rd quintile 385 511.15 58.14 486 1038.58 87.83
  4th quintile 385 787.23 108.75 487 1412.04 128.86
  5th quintile 385 2188.16 1648.92 486 2712.05 1610.68
Equivalent OOP expenditure 1923 107.49 345.85 2433 172.81 290.63
Incidence of catastrophic health expenditure 513 26.68% 869 35.72%
Health insurance
  None 3120 59.26% 2909 47.01%
  Any 2145 40.74% 3279 52.99%
Public health insurance types 1922 36.51% 2988 48.29%
  UEBMI 1374 26.10% 2100 33.94%
  URBMI 0 0.00% 273 4.41%
  CMS (NCMS) 6 0.11% 50 0.81%
  Other insurance 542 10.29% 565 9.13%
  None 3343 63.49% 3200 51.71%
Private health insurance types 359 6.82% 297 4.80%
All expenditures are presented in US$.
The threshold of the catastrophic health expenditure is 25% of non-food household expenditure in this study.
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2003 to 2008 National Health Services Survey data.
NCMS, New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme; OOP, out-of-pocket; UEBMI, Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance; URBMI, Urban 
Residents’ Basic Medical Insurance.
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group’s population share and its post-payment income 
share, aj:
 
 
H =
∑
j
ajG
X−P
j
 
 (5)
R captures the extent of reranking of households that 
occurs in the move from pre-payment to post-payment 
income distributions. It is measured as the difference 
between the post-payment Gini coefficient GX−P and the 
post-payment concentration index CX−P. The latter differs 
from the former in that households are ranked by their 
pre-payment income, not their post-payment income. If 
there is no reranking, R is zero.
  R = GX−P − CX−P  (6)
In sum, the total RE can be decomposed into four 
components: an average rate effect (g), the depar-
ture-from-proportionality or progressivity effect (KE), a 
horizontal inequity effect H and a reranking effect R.
Patient and public involvement
All data in this study were derived from the household 
survey, so no patients and the public were involved in 
the study design, the outcome measures, data analysis or 
interpretation of the results. Results will be disseminated 
to study participants via this publication.
results
Decompositions of the RE of healthcare financing sources 
are presented in tables 3-6. The distribution of healthcare 
financing sources across equivalent income deciles, along 
with the corresponding values of g, V, H, R and RE, V, H 
and R, is also presented as a percentage of RE.
re of urban areas in 2002
In urban areas in 2002, payments to healthcare accounted 
for 15.70% of the total household expenditures (g for 
total payments in table 3). The RE value was positive, 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and socioeconomic characteristics for the rural sample
Variable
2002 2007
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
Gender (female) 3063 0.49 4808 0.50
Age (years) 6307 33.39 18.02 9638 36.57 19.17
  0–14 1133 8.22 4.42 1497 7.33 4.22
  14–59 4704 35.92 11.91 7080 37.95 12.33
  60+ 470 68.70 7.06 1061 68.57 7.46
Number of household members (average) 1918 3.29 1.12 3097 3.25 1.16
Equivalent household income 1918 408.49 334.99 3097 975.97 708.17
  1st quintile 383 155.97 35.45 619 426.42 87.44
  2nd quintile 385 243.28 23.37 620 640.02 49.12
  3rd quintile 383 326.94 27.49 620 826.73 57.68
  4th quintile 384 443.90 45.74 619 1075.66 93.17
  5th quintile 383 873.13 492.62 619 1911.79 1079.40
Equivalent OOP expenditure 1918 56.28 153.78 3097 126.78 296.75
Incidence of catastrophic health expenditure 485 25.29% 694 22.41%
Health insurance
  None 5311 84.21% 905 9.39%
  Any 996 15.79% 8733 90.61%
Public health insurance types 597 9.47% 8627 89.50%
  UEBMI 71 1.13% 34 0.35%
  URBMI 0 0.00% 4 0.04%
  CMS (NCMS) 347 5.50% 8401 87.16%
  Other insurance 179 2.84% 188 1.95%
  None 5710 90.53% 1012 10.50%
Private health insurance types 402 6.37% 773 8.02%
All expenditures are presented in US$.
The threshold of the catastrophic health expenditure is 25% of non-food household expenditure in this study.
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2003 to 2008 National Health Services Survey data.
NCMS, New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme; OOP, out-of-pocket; UEBMI, Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance; URBMI, Urban 
Residents’ Basic Medical Insurance.
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indicating healthcare financing had a pro-poor redistri-
bution. The V/RE ratio was 359.42%, which indicated that 
the positive RE would be 259.42% greater in the absence 
of horizontal inequity (ie, H+R). In terms of specific 
healthcare financing source, general taxes and private 
health insurance exhibited pro-rich redistribution, while 
public health insurance and OOP payment showed the 
opposite effect. In addition, the negative RE of general 
tax and private health insurance would be 24.68% and 
50.60% smaller in the absence of horizontal inequity, 
while the positive RE of public health insurance and OOP 
payment would be 19.77% and 231.53% greater in the 
absence of horizontal inequity.
re of rural areas in 2002
In rural areas in 2002, payments to healthcare accounted 
for 14.61% of the total household expenditures (g for 
total payments in table 4). The RE value was negative, 
indicating healthcare financing had a pro-rich redistribu-
tion. The V/RE ratio was −311.62%, which indicated that 
the negative RE would be 411.62% smaller in the absence 
of horizontal inequity. In terms of specific healthcare 
financing source, all healthcare payments were pro-rich 
distributed. The negative RE of general taxes, public and 
private health insurance and OOP payment would be 
15.41%, 215.17%, 124.18% and 462.90% smaller in the 
absence of horizontal inequity.
re of urban areas in 2007
In urban areas in 2007, 19.30% of household expen-
diture was paid to healthcare (g for total payments in 
table 5). The RE value was negative, indicating healthcare 
financing had a pro-rich redistribution. The V/RE ratio 
was −21.70%, which indicated that the negative RE would 
be 121.70% smaller in the absence of horizontal inequity. 
In terms of specific healthcare financing source, general 
taxes, private health insurance and OOP payment were 
pro-rich redistributed, while public health insurance 
was pro-poor redistributed. In addition, the negative 
RE of general taxes, private health insurance and OOP 
payment would be 52.60%, 306.03% and 88.42% smaller 
in the absence of horizontal inequity, while the positive 
RE of public health insurance would be 40.92% greater in 
the absence of horizontal inequity.
re of rural areas in 2007
In rural areas in 2007, 14.98% of household expen-
diture was paid to healthcare (g for total payments in 
table 6). The RE value was negative, indicating health-
care financing had a pro-rich redistribution. The V/RE 
ratio was −13.71%, which indicated that the negative RE 
would be 113.71% smaller in the absence of horizontal 
inequity. In terms of specific healthcare financing source, 
all healthcare payments were pro-rich distributed. The 
negative RE of general taxes, public and private health 
Table 3 Decomposition of the REs of the Chinese urban healthcare financing system in 2002
Decile
Per capital 
household 
expenditure General taxes
Public health 
insurance
Private health 
insurance OOP Total payments
1 (poorest) 1.97% 2.07% 0.52% 1.01% 1.53% 1.44%
2 2.95% 3.12% 0.81% 4.92% 2.19% 2.18%
3 3.86% 4.08% 1.33% 6.00% 2.83% 2.86%
4 4.76% 4.97% 2.83% 3.65% 3.94% 3.92%
5 5.74% 5.89% 3.82% 4.54% 5.28% 5.12%
6 6.98% 7.22% 4.91% 6.45% 5.87% 5.95%
7 8.64% 9.09% 8.40% 14.02% 6.91% 7.70%
8 10.86% 11.33% 17.03% 9.31% 8.70% 10.60%
9 14.60% 14.85% 34.95% 28.02% 13.24% 17.58%
10 (richest) 39.64% 37.38% 25.40% 22.10% 49.51% 42.66%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
g 0.003789 0.011082 0.008820 0.133309 0.157001
V −0.000063 0.001162 −0.000666 0.014464 0.015376
H 0.000021 0.000173 0.000382 0.003487 0.004015
R 0.000000 0.000019 0.000301 0.006615 0.007083
RE −0.000084 0.000970 −0.001349 0.004363 0.004278
RE/RE 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
V/RE 75.32% 119.77% 49.40% 331.53% 359.42%
H/RE −24.68% 17.84% −28.32% 79.92% 93.85%
R/RE 0.00% 1.93% −22.28% 151.62% 165.57%
g, payments as fraction of income; H, horizontal inequity; OOP, out-of-pocket; R, reranking; RE, redistributive effect; V, vertical effect.
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insurance and OOP payment would be 35.42%, 0.36%, 
52.01% and 152.92% smaller in the absence of horizontal 
inequity.
DIsCussIOn
Horizontal inequity decreased over the period 2002–2007 
in both urban and rural areas. Meanwhile, the extent of 
reranking also reduced over the same period in both 
urban and rural areas, indicating that the impact of 
healthcare finance on impoverishment was lessened.
The biggest challenge for horizontal equity in China’s 
healthcare finance originated from OOP payments. OOP 
payments as fraction of income (g) were far larger than all 
other healthcare financing sources. This implied that the 
RE of total healthcare payment was largely dominated by 
OOP payments in China. Although OOP has been found 
to be the main reason for the pro-rich redistribution in 
other countries, the impact was much smaller than that in 
China.7 9 For example, in Switzerland, horizontal inequity 
of OOP accounted for 12.4 percentage points of the RE, 
whereas reranking accounted for 9.8 percentage points 
of the RE.9 Our study has shown that horizontal inequity 
in OOP payments has been reduced both in urban and 
rural areas over the period 2002–2007. The horizontal 
inequity in OOP payments had mainly stemmed from the 
different health conditions and health insurance schemes 
among individuals with the same income level. As the 
distribution of health conditions among the population 
was unlikely to have changed markedly during a relatively 
short time period, the reduction of horizontal inequity 
was more likely largely attributable to the reform and 
establishment of the new health insurance programmes. 
This finding agrees with a study from the Netherlands, in 
which vertical and horizontal inequity were both found to 
be largely attributable to the different choices of benefit 
packages of health insurance schemes.7 The extent of 
reranking of OOP payments was much larger than other 
healthcare payments, and it was found that the rank 
order of individuals who financed healthcare through 
OOP payments decreased markedly.
In 2002, urban public health insurance was the UEBMI 
scheme, and it covered mainly workers in the public sector. 
In 2007, the UEBMI and URBMI schemes were both in 
effect, with the former covering workers in both the public 
and private sectors, while the latter covered citizens who 
were ineligible to enrol in the UEBMI scheme, such as 
students, the elderly and the unemployed. China’s public 
health insurance was managed and run at the city level and 
UEBMI premiums were different between cities. This was 
the main reason for the horizontal inequity in public health 
insurance in urban areas in 2002. Excluding this reason, in 
2007, the different financing schemes between the UEBMI 
Table 4 Decomposition of REs of Chinese rural healthcare financing system in 2002
Decile
Per capital 
household 
expenditure General taxes
Public health 
insurance
Private health 
insurance OOP Total payments
1 (poorest) 3.09% 3.43% 1.35% 0.89% 2.17% 2.22%
2 4.53% 4.80% 1.46% 3.23% 4.43% 3.96%
3 5.46% 5.86% 3.26% 3.35% 4.58% 4.55%
4 6.46% 6.86% 6.37% 4.59% 5.34% 5.76%
5 7.38% 7.75% 14.62% 11.23% 6.07% 7.95%
6 8.59% 8.74% 13.18% 10.80% 8.90% 9.65%
7 9.93% 10.29% 8.46% 8.14% 7.91% 8.42%
8 11.81% 11.73% 12.11% 20.12% 12.55% 12.51%
9 14.97% 15.08% 7.19% 17.32% 13.22% 12.60%
10 (richest) 27.78% 25.46% 31.99% 20.33% 34.83% 32.39%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
g 0.003705 0.001190 0.003403 0.137787 0.146085
V −0.000094 0.000038 0.000104 0.013238 0.013424
H 0.000017 0.000043 0.000163 0.004659 0.004876
R 0.000000 0.000029 0.000371 0.012227 0.012856
RE −0.000111 −0.000033 −0.000431 −0.003648 −0.004308
RE–RE 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
V–RE 84.58% −115.17% −24.18% −362.90% −311.62%
H–RE −15.41% −127.93% −37.94% −127.71% −113.19%
R–RE 0.00% −87.24% −86.25% −335.18% −298.43%
g, payments as fraction of income; H, horizontal inequity; OOP, out-of-pocket; R, reranking; RE, redistributive effect; V, vertical effect.
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and the URBMI, as well as the disparity in financing contri-
bution to the UEBMI between public and private sectors, 
also resulted in horizontal inequity. This explains why hori-
zontal inequity in urban public health insurance increased 
over the period 2002–2007. In 2002, CMS provided rural 
public health insurance, covering <10% of rural residents. 
In 2007, NCMS covered >90% of rural residents. Both CMS 
and NCMS were based on flat rate contributions. Thus, the 
horizontal inequity in rural health insurance came from the 
different financing contribution between different cities, 
and came from the covered and the uncovered parties. 
Since almost all rural residents were covered by NCMS in 
2007, the horizontal inequity in rural public health insur-
ance was dramatically reduced over the period. Private 
health insurance did not play an important role in China’s 
health insurance reform because the government decided 
to achieve Universal Health Coverage through public 
health insurance. Currently, only about 5% of the popula-
tion is enrolled in private health insurance.29 The insurees 
purchase different types of insurance from different insur-
ance companies. Therefore, the horizontal inequities are 
comparatively high.
Our findings demonstrated that horizontal inequity in 
general taxes increased from 2002 to 2007, and that hori-
zontal inequity was higher in urban areas than in rural 
areas. The main income source for households in China 
in our sample was wages. Taxes for households consisted 
primarily of personal income tax. Because of economic 
development, individuals—and especially those in urban 
areas— earned their income from a variety of sources, and 
people with the same income levels had a much greater 
variety of income compositions than in the past. Different 
income types were subject to different tax rates, which 
resulted in increased horizontal inequity. Horizontal 
inequity in relation to personal income tax was found 
to have decreased between 1980 and 1990 in Sweden, 
where the ceiling of taxable income range was abolished 
following economic development. Overall, such a policy 
ensures that the tax is largely borne by the rich.8
Despite the fact that horizontal, vertical and reranking 
effects are usually expressed and explained as a 
percentage of the total RE, some results need to be inter-
preted with caution. While the horizontal inequity of 
OOP and total payments in relative terms decreased over 
the period 2002–2007, in absolute terms, horizontal ineq-
uity increased over during that period in both urban and 
rural areas. As horizontal inequity was measured by the 
weighted sum of Gini coefficients in each income quintile 
group,7 8 the increase of horizontal inequity in the absolute 
term indicates a more inequitable distribution within the 
income quintile group. Furthermore, the RE decreased 
both in urban and rural areas from 2002 to 2007 in our 
study, indicating that the healthcare financing system 
had become more pro-rich over the period. In a previous 
Table 5 Decomposition of REs of Chinese urban healthcare financing system in 2007
Decile
Per capital 
household 
expenditure General taxes
Public health 
insurance
Private health 
insurance OOP Total payments
1 (poorest) 3.14% 3.49% 1.05% 5.17% 2.68% 2.59%
2 4.52% 4.80% 2.36% 2.82% 4.16% 3.85%
3 5.55% 5.66% 4.07% 4.49% 5.91% 5.37%
4 6.49% 6.59% 5.30% 6.46% 6.75% 6.36%
5 7.47% 7.46% 6.82% 5.56% 8.02% 7.51%
6 8.66% 8.57% 9.01% 4.27% 9.10% 8.77%
7 10.16% 9.95% 10.59% 10.31% 11.43% 10.83%
8 11.82% 11.48% 12.68% 15.70% 13.55% 12.92%
9 14.54% 14.62% 17.35% 16.01% 13.35% 14.70%
10 (richest) 27.66% 27.39% 30.77% 29.20% 25.04% 27.11%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
g 0.004710 0.045590 0.008282 0.134454 0.193035
V −0.000022 0.005007 0.000428 −0.002364 0.003885
H 0.000024 0.000995 0.000352 0.005067 0.006355
R 0.000000 0.000459 0.000284 0.012975 0.015431
RE −0.000046 0.003553 −0.000208 −0.020406 −0.017901
RE–RE 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
V–RE 47.40% 140.92% −206.03% 11.58% −21.70%
H–RE −52.60% 28.02% −169.28% −24.83% −35.50%
R–RE 0.00% 12.91% −136.75% −63.59% −86.20%
g, payments as fraction of income; H, horizontal inequity; OOP, out-of-pocket; R, reranking; RE, redistributive effect; V, vertical effect.
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study in the same area, Chen et al found that the Kakwani 
index of the total healthcare payments decreased from 
2002 to 2007.29 This is consistent with our study’s finding 
that vertical equity (V) decreased over the period 2002–
2007. We have also found that horizontal inequity (H) 
increased in both urban and rural areas over the same 
time period. In addition, reranking (R) decreased in rural 
areas but increased in urban areas from 2002 to 2007. 
When considering V, H and R together, RE decreased in 
both urban and rural areas. This finding indicates that 
improving both vertical and horizontal equity in health-
care financing system could improve pro-poor redistribu-
tion to a large extent in the study population. However, 
equitable vertical and horizontal distributions are hard to 
achieve simultaneously. Taking NCMS as an example, a 
flat rate premium could result in an equitable horizontal 
distribution, but at the cost of worsened vertical equity, as 
all insured individuals would pay the same premium, irre-
spective of their incomes. In addition, some public insur-
ance schemes are financed at the county level and it is 
also important to consider other amenable factors such as 
sex, age and location in policy interventions. Therefore, 
we should weigh horizontal equity against vertical equity 
in healthcare financing system reform. Future work is 
warranted to investigate the optimal trade-off between 
horizontal and vertical equity to achieve a more pro-poor 
redistribution in the healthcare financing system.
Healthcare financing has changed dramatically since the 
initiation of health insurance reform within the study region. 
The proportion of general taxes in the healthcare financing 
system increased from 15.15% in 2002 to 27.26% in 2015.27 
During this time, with the help of information technology, a 
strict tax supervision policy was implemented and tax avoid-
ance was hard to achieve. This resulted in the reduction of 
horizontal inequity in respect of general tax. Meanwhile, 
the proportion of public health insurance in the healthcare 
financing system increased from 19.12% in 2002 to 36.76% 
in 2015.27 However, due to the policy goal of universal health 
coverage and an increasing rate of urbanisation, the URBMI 
and NCMS schemes were gradually integrated. This suggests 
that many more individuals with different natural and social 
characteristics were covered in the same insurance schemes, 
which in turn brought about an increase of horizontal ineq-
uity. On the contrary, the proportion of OOP payments 
notably decreased from 65.73% in 2002 to 35.98% in 2015.27 
Consequently, the horizontal inequity in respect of total 
healthcare finance was reduced by the decreasing impact of 
OOP payments.
The current study has only examined data from one 
province in China, which is unlikely to fully represent 
horizontal equity in China’s healthcare financing system 
overall. Studies using nationally representative data are 
warranted to evaluate horizontal equity following the 
national health insurance reforms in China.
Table 6 Decomposition of REs of Chinese rural healthcare financing system in 2007
Decile
Per capital 
household 
expenditure General taxes
Public health 
insurance
Private health 
insurance OOP Total payments
1 (poorest) 3.63% 3.75% 11.08% 4.30% 3.36% 5.29
2 5.10% 5.20% 9.74% 10.25% 4.97% 6.33
3 6.13% 6.27% 9.70% 5.94% 5.81% 6.84
4 6.97% 7.04% 10.05% 10.28% 7.15% 7.92
5 7.97% 8.08% 9.74% 9.46% 7.77% 8.37
6 8.98% 9.19% 9.59% 8.00% 7.94% 8.64
7 10.18% 10.43% 10.62% 10.08% 9.06% 9.80
8 11.84% 11.92% 10.08% 12.33% 11.25% 11.18
9 14.45% 14.25% 10.37% 9.58% 15.62% 13.84
10 (richest) 24.74% 23.86% 9.03% 19.78% 27.06% 21.79
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
g 0.004744 0.002764 0.012405 0.129908 0.149821
V −0.000035 −0.000864 −0.001599 0.004933 0.002138
H 0.000019 0.000003 0.000770 0.004951 0.005788
R 0.000000 0.000000 0.000962 0.009306 0.011943
RE −0.000053 −0.000867 −0.003331 −0.009323 −0.015593
RE–RE 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
V–RE 64.58% 99.64% 47.99% −52.92% −13.71%
H–RE −35.42% −0.36% −23.13% −53.10% −37.12%
R–RE 0.00% 0.00% −28.88% −99.82% −76.59%
g, payments as fraction of income; H, horizontal inequity; OOP, out-of-pocket; R, reranking; RE, redistributive effect; V, vertical effect.
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COnClusIOns
Overall, horizontal inequity in China’s total healthcare 
financing has decreased during the period 2002–2007. 
In addition, OOP payments were found to have contrib-
uted most to the overall healthcare payments and hori-
zontal inequity in OOP payments has decreased. These 
findings have important implications for future health-
care financing reforms: China’s further health insurance 
reform should target cost and service coverage in order to 
decrease the impact of OOP payments.
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